Mr. Speegle did not pay the Hospital its $142,915.01. Instead, he filed a declaratory judgment suit arguing that the hospital lien was invalid because the Hospital supposedly failed to comply with Chapter 146 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code by not billing Medicare for Mr. Speegle’s treatment. Both the Hospital and Mr. Speegle moved for summary judgment. The trial court ruled that Mr. Speegle had to pay the hospital lien in the amount of $142,915.01.   The Court of Appeals analyzed 42 U.S.C. § 1395, which was the secondary payer statute in effect at the time of Mr. Speegle’s treatment. It noted that this statute expressly prohibits Medicare from paying if a liability insurer has already paid or is reasonably expected to pay “promptly.” It noted that according to the regulations adopted by the Healthcare Financing Administration, “promptly” is defined as within 120 days of the earlier of the date a lien is filed against a potential liability settlement or the date of discharge. Therefore, Medicare is a secondary payer in situations where a Medicare beneficiary’s hospital lien is covered by liability insurance, and Medicare is prohibited from paying during the 120-day “promptly” period.   What are the rights of healthcare providers after expiration of the “promptly” period? The Court noted that in 1995 the Healthcare Financing Administra-tion issued a memorandum providing that the provider or supplier of services “may, but is not required to, bill Medicare for conditional payment if the liability insurance claim is not finally resolved. The successor entity, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, has published the same construction in its Medicare Secondary Payer Manual. This Manual, among other things, provides that if a provider of medical services bills Medicare, then the provider must accept the Medicare payment as full satisfaction of the bill. However, if the provider pursues recovery from a liability insurer, it may charge the actual charges, up to the amount of the proceeds of the liability insurance, less applicable procurement costs. However, it may not collect from the beneficiary until after the proceeds of the liability insurance are available to the beneficiary.

   Therefore, under all applicable regulations, after the 120-day “promptly” period ends, whenever services provided to a Medicare beneficiary are also covered by a liability insurance policy, medical providers have the right either to bill Medicare or to maintain a lien against a potential liability insurance settlement. The Court held that the Hospital was entitled to recover the full amount of its lien. 

   Mr. Speegle argued that the hospital lien was invalid because the Hospital supposedly failed to comply with § 146.002(c) of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code. This statute includes a requirement that healthcare service providers timely bill third party payers, including Medicare, whenever they are “authorized” to do so. The Court determined that Chapter 146 requires medical care providers to bill Medicare for services received by Medicare eligible patients when providers are permitted – such as after the 120-day “promptly” period. In such circumstances, however, the Court noted that Chapter 146 conflicts with federal law requiring Medicare to be regarded as a secondary payer and granting hospitals the option of maintaining a hospital lien, even if they are authorized to bill Medicare instead.

  The Court analyzed this conflict between state and federal law and determined that state law is preempted by federal law under these circumstances. Therefore, Mr. Speegle’s argument was overruled.
The Hospital was entitled to recover the full amount of its lien.

  Zinc Nacional, S.A. v. Bouche Trucking, Inc., 53 Tex.Sup.Ct.J. 574. Zinc Nacional is a Mexican company which sells paper to a company in New Mexico. Zinc uses third-party shippers to move the paper through Texas to New Mexico. It has no offices, agents or employees in Texas and does not advertise its paper products in Texas. Zinc does sell other products to Texas manufacturers, but not the paper.

  One day Zinc loaded several rolls of paper on to a trailer owned by an independent shipping company. At the border in Laredo, Texas, the trailer was handed over to a truck operated by Bouche Trucking, Inc. for delivery to New Mexico.
During this trip, and while the truck was still in Texas, the rolls of paper shifted and the truck overturned, injuring the driver, Mr. Arrellano.
Mr. Arrellano brought a negligence action against Bouche. Bouche, in turn, brought a third-party petition against Zinc seeking indemnity and contribution.

  Zinc took the position that the Texas court did not have personal jurisdiction over it and made a special appearance to contest that jurisdiction. The trial court denied the special appearance, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals held that Zinc had purposefully availed itself of Texas benefits by hiring the shipping company, and held that Zinc had thereby established sufficient minimum contacts for purposes of specific jurisdiction.

  The Supreme Court said that the mere fact that goods have traveled into Texas, without more, does not establish the minimum contacts necessary to subject a manufacturer to personal jurisdiction within the state. It said that a merchant’s decision to ship its goods with a third-party shipper that will travel through Texas to a recipient outside of Texas does not, by itself, constitute purposeful availment of the benefits of doing business in the state.

  The Supreme Court held that Zinc lacked the minimum contacts with Texas necessary to establish specific jurisdiction. It reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and the trial court.

  Hyde Park Baptist Church v. Turner, 53 Tex.Sup.Ct.J. 765. Mr. and Mrs. Turner had a child who received child care at Hyde Park Baptist Church. They discovered that the child had been physically and emotionally mistreated at the church and sued the church and the child’s teacher, alleging damages including medical costs, psychological therapy and mental anguish.

  The jury found that the teacher’s intentional act or acts proximately caused injury to the child and that the church’s negligence contributed to his injuries. The jury further allocated 80% of the responsibility to the church and 20% to the teacher. The jury awarded $3,582 for past medical expenses, $34,980 for future medical expenses, $25,000 for past physical pain and mental anguish, and $100,000 for future mental anguish.

  The Court of Appeals examined the evidence and said that it could not conclude the jury’s allocation of proportionate responsibility was so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust. It affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

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